The Monroe Doctrine 2.0
The America First Strategy for Hemispheric Dominance in a Multipolar World
For nearly two centuries, the Monroe Doctrine has functioned as the foundation of American strategic thinking in the Western Hemisphere. First articulated in 1823, it was a policy designed to assert the United States’ sphere of influence, warning European powers that further colonial ambitions in the Americas would be met with resistance. Over time, its interpretation shifted, adapting to the geopolitical realities of the moment. From Theodore Roosevelt’s corollary that justified U.S. intervention in Latin America to Cold War-era policies aimed at preventing Soviet expansion, the doctrine evolved from a defensive posture into an assertion of hemispheric hegemony.
In recent years, the concept has re-emerged as part of a broader strategic recalibration in response to shifting global power structures. The post-Cold War order, which had long been predicated on U.S. primacy and the unchallenged integration of Western economies, has given way to a more contested multipolar reality. As rival powers assert themselves on the global stage, the United States appears to be returning to a doctrine of regional dominance, emphasizing the consolidation of power within its own hemisphere while pushing back against external encroachments.
The defining feature of this geopolitical shift has been the growing presence of China in Latin America. Over the past two decades, Beijing has dramatically expanded its economic footprint in the region, becoming the largest trading partner for countries such as Brazil, Chile, and Peru. The Belt and Road Initiative has facilitated large-scale Chinese infrastructure investments across Latin America, providing much-needed capital for development projects but also deepening China’s strategic ties with governments historically within Washington’s sphere of influence. In parallel, Russia has maintained close relationships with anti-U.S. governments, particularly Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, reinforcing its military and intelligence cooperation in the region.
Against this backdrop, the United States has signaled a shift back to a more assertive hemispheric strategy, one that echoes past iterations of the Monroe Doctrine. During the first Trump administration, figures such as National Security Advisor John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo openly invoked the doctrine in reference to countering Chinese and Russian influence in the Americas. More recent rhetoric and policy measures suggest that this approach has not been abandoned but rather adapted to the emerging multipolar landscape.
At the core of this realignment is a renewed emphasis on securing U.S. influence in North America. The restructuring of NAFTA into the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) reflected a broader effort to reassert Washington’s primacy over regional economic frameworks. There has also been increased scrutiny over Canada’s economic entanglements with China, particularly regarding its critical mineral exports and technological partnerships, which have been identified as potential vulnerabilities within U.S. strategic planning.
The discussion surrounding Greenland, an often-overlooked Arctic territory, illustrates the shifting priorities within this strategy. The Trump administration’s interest in purchasing Greenland from Denmark, which was initially dismissed as an anomaly, reflected a growing recognition of the island’s geostrategic value. Greenland’s untapped mineral resources and its position as a gateway to the Arctic have placed it at the center of emerging great power competition. As climate change accelerates the opening of Arctic shipping routes, control over Greenland’s infrastructure and resources is likely to remain a strategic concern in Washington’s long-term calculus.
Beyond the northern front, the United States has also intensified its focus on Latin America, particularly in countering the growing influence of external actors. A key element of this approach has been economic pressure on governments engaged in extensive partnerships with China. Efforts to dissuade Latin American countries from deepening their involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative have included diplomatic engagement, economic incentives, and, in some cases, more direct coercive measures.
Simultaneously, U.S. military posture in the region has seen renewed attention. The expansion of Southern Command’s operations, coupled with security agreements with Colombia and Brazil, reflects an effort to reestablish deterrence against foreign military and intelligence activities in the hemisphere. The continued presence of Russian military advisors in Venezuela and reports of Chinese investments in South American military infrastructure have contributed to growing concerns within the U.S. defense establishment about potential security vulnerabilities.
Another aspect of this recalibration has been Washington’s approach to governance and stability in Latin America. While past interventions in the region have been justified on ideological grounds—whether combating communism during the Cold War or promoting democracy in the post-Soviet era—the current strategy appears to be shaped more by pragmatic security concerns. The ongoing instability in Mexico, fueled by cartel violence and its role as a hub for fentanyl trafficking, has led to discussions about the extent to which U.S. interventionist policies might be required to stabilize critical regions. The concept of direct military engagement, long considered politically untenable, has resurfaced in policy discussions, particularly regarding counter-cartel operations.
At the same time, economic policy in the hemisphere has taken on a more strategic dimension, particularly concerning energy and resource security. The Biden administration’s Inflation Reduction Act and related energy policies have emphasized reducing dependence on Chinese-controlled supply chains for critical minerals. Given Latin America’s significant reserves of lithium, copper, and other essential materials, ensuring that these resources remain within U.S.-aligned economic frameworks has become a priority. The exclusion of China from direct access to these supply chains, whether through diplomatic agreements or trade restrictions, aligns with the broader trend of reinforcing hemispheric self-sufficiency.
The contemporary iteration of the Monroe Doctrine does not reflect an isolated shift but rather a broader pattern in global strategic realignment. The United States is increasingly prioritizing the Western Hemisphere in its foreign policy decisions, aligning with a broader trend of regionalization that has accompanied the erosion of the post-Cold War global order. The emphasis on securing economic, military, and political dominance in North and South America is part of a larger effort to consolidate influence in an era where global hegemony is no longer guaranteed.
This transformation has implications beyond U.S. foreign policy. Latin American governments, long accustomed to a degree of autonomy in balancing relations with multiple global powers, are now facing renewed pressure to align their economic and security policies more closely with Washington. The extent to which these countries resist or accommodate this shift will shape the geopolitical landscape of the region in the coming decades.
Ultimately, the reemergence of Monroe Doctrine principles in modern U.S. strategy reflects the realities of a multipolar world rather than a singular ideological shift. As great power competition intensifies, the United States has moved toward a more defensive, regionally focused strategy, seeking to consolidate its influence in the Western Hemisphere while countering external encroachments. Whether this marks a return to prolonged interventionism or merely a recalibration of hemispheric partnerships remains to be seen. However, the trajectory suggests that the doctrine, far from being a relic of history, continues to inform and shape the strategic imperatives of the present.